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International Law and Domestic Legitimacy:
Remarks prepared for Lincoln’s
Constitutionalism in Time of War: Lessons for
the Current War on Terror?
Scott Sullivan*
INTRODUCTION
It is serendipitous that the bicentennial of Abraham
Lincoln’s birth coincides with the seating of a new American
president facing tremendous economic and national security
difficulties. The success of the Lincoln Presidency in concluding
and assuring the survival of the United States from the divisions
of the Civil War reminds us of the enormous hardships the
American people can bear and the power of a perseverant
president.
The focus of this symposium on Lincoln’s Constitutionalism
in a Time of War and this particular panel of discussants on
Suspending Rights to Sustain Public Safety is apt. Lincoln’s
policies during the Civil War are perhaps most noteworthy for
their elevation of necessity over formalism.
His political
pragmatism asserted that no President can allow the foundation
of the nation to crumble due to reflexive pursuit of rigid
formalism.1 In other words, the President’s responsibility to
faithfully execute the laws of the nation could not countenance a
world in which, when referencing habeas corpus protections, “all
the laws, but one, to go unexecuted, and the government itself go
to pieces, lest that one be violated.”2 Under Lincoln’s doctrine, no
law would morally be held as preeminent when the fabric of the
nation is at risk of being pulled asunder. In comparison to many
of the rather drastic measures taken during the Civil War, the
policies of the Bush Administration appear tame and
unobjectionable. I presume that Professors John Yoo and
* Assistant Professor of Law, Paul M. Herbert Law Center, Louisiana State
University. This essay reflects remarks made at the 2009 Chapman Law Review
Symposium: Lincoln's Constitutionalism in Time of War: Lessons for the Current War on
Terror?
1 See Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress in Special Session (July 4, 1981), in
THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 421, 430–31 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953).
2 Id. at 430.
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Kyndra Rotunda will assert arguments that, in comparison to the
measures of President Lincoln, the comparatively subdued
nature of Bush Administration policies should be left unmolested
by the courts and accepted by the populace as similarly necessary
measures justified by a terrorist threat that killed over 3,000
people on September 11 and continues to hang over our shores.
I am sympathetic to these assertions.
Many of the
substantive elements of the Bush Administration’s response to
September 11 were not, in and of themselves, objectionable. The
reality, however, is that despite the nature and magnitude of the
threat of terrorism, the policies that have come to represent the
cornerstones of President Bush’s execution of the war on terror
have been repudiated—not only by the courts—but they have
been repudiated by our allies abroad and our population at home.
I intend to use my contribution to this symposium to reflect
on the interplay between domestic policies in armed conflict and
the international legal regulations promulgated under
international law relative to the ability of the state to have its
policies viewed as “legitimate” by its population and
international allies.
I. THE POWER AND PROCESS OF LEGITIMATION
Lincoln’s execution of the Civil War demonstrated little
patience with legal niceties that could potentially impede his
prosecution of the war effort.3
Some of Lincoln’s most
controversial acts include unilaterally suspending habeas corpus
rights in parts of the Confederacy,4 engaging in military action
that was unsanctioned by Congress,5 embracing the concept of
total war that led to the burning of Atlanta by General
Sherman’s troops,6 and ordering a military blockade in the
absence of congressional authorization.7
Critics argued that each of these acts violated the laws of the
United States and core principles of separation of powers that
vested particular foreign affairs powers, such as the power to
declare war, and, more implicitly, the judgment to suspend
3 See MARK E. NEELY, JR., THE FATE OF LIBERTY: ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND CIVIL
LIBERTIES 11–12 (2001).
4 Curt Bentley, Constrained by the Liberal Tradition: Why the Supreme Court Has
Not Found Positive Rights in the American Constitution, 2007 BYU L. REV. 1721, 1745
n.120 (2007) (“For example, Abraham Lincoln unilaterally suspended the Writ of Habeas
Corpus, ignoring Justice Taney's decision in Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (1861),
during the Civil War.”).
5 LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER 38 (1995).
6 Major Jeffrey F. Addicott, Operation Desert Storm: R. E. Lee or W. T. Sherman?,
136 MIL. L. REV. 115, 122–23, 128–29 (1992).
7 FISHER, supra note 5, at 38.
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habeas corpus during certain emergencies.8
Despite these
critiques his presidency progressed with the unmistakable air
that despite legal uncertainty, or even Constitutional violation,
the preservation of the Union was a goal of sufficient importance
to override any particular provision of law.9 This doctrine was
justified by the administration as one of “necessity” that if not
authorizing power to the President beyond the scope of the
Constitution, at least provided substantial bend to Constitutional
prerogatives in times of national emergency.10
The rights-restricting actions imposed during the ongoing
war on terror have been much more restrained than that of the
Civil War. Unlike Lincoln’s broad grants of power to military
commanders to suspend habeas corpus as they saw fit, there has
been no suspension of the right of habeas corpus.11 The detention
facilities at the U.S. Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay compare
quite favorably to the harsh treatment and occasional summary
execution suffered during the Civil War. Similarly, President
Bush has received Congressional authorization for each major
military operation in which his administration engaged, despite
his clear belief that such assent is Constitutionally
unnecessary.12
In such light, it is curious that Benjamin Wittes represented
mainstream sentiment, both domestically and abroad, when he
stated before the Senate Judiciary Committee that, “[a] few years
ago in the winter of 2002, almost nobody doubted . . . that the
United States is entitled to detain enemy forces in the war on
terrorism. Today, doubt concerning the legitimacy of war on
terrorism detentions is more the norm than the exception.”13
8 See Paul Finkelman, Civil Liberties and Civil War: The Great Emancipator as
Civil Libertarian, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1353, 1358–60 (1993) (reviewing MARK E. NEELY, JR.,
THE FATE OF LIBERTY: ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND CIVIL LIBERTIES (1991)).
9 See NEELY, supra note 3, at 235.
10 See Neely, supra note 3, at 12–13; Paul Finkelman, Limiting Rights in Times of
Crises: Our Civil War Experience—A History Lesson for a Post-9-11 America, 2 CARDOZO
PUB. L., POL’Y & ETHICS J. 25, 39–41 (2003).
11 The Honorable Frank J. Williams et al., Still a Frightening Unknown: Achieving a
Constitutional Balance between Civil Liberties and National Security during the War on
Terror, 12 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 675, 740 (2007) (“The United States Constitution
explicitly allows for the complete suspension of habeas corpus rights during wartime, but
the current administration recognized that the more judicious approach would be to
delay, not eliminate the right of Article III court review.”).
12 Memorandum Opinion For the Deputy Counsel to The President, The President’s
Constitutional Authority to Conduct Military Operations Against Terrorists and Nations
Supporting Them, (Sept. 25, 2001), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/
warpowers925.htm (noting that the President has broad constitutional power to take
military action in response to the Terrorist Attacks on the United States on September
11, 2001).
13 Improving Detainee Policy: Handling Terrorism Detainees Within the American
Justice System: Hearing Before the Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate,
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A. The Underpinnings of Legitimate State Action and Failings
in the War on Terror
The conventional wisdom that President Lincoln’s draconian
restrictions on civil rights and infringements on Constitutional
culture were legitimate while President Bush’s were not begs the
question of what “legitimacy” is composed of and how it is
derived. Clearly, this question is enormous in its breadth and
cannot be adequately examined in the time and space limitations
here. This conventional wisdom, however, is consistent with
much of what we understand of how state actions and
institutions gain legitimacy through collective acceptance, even
when those actions are also considered normatively suspect.
1. Building Legitimacy in State Action
In a 2005 article in the Harvard Law Review, Richard Fallon
noted that legitimacy has three dimensions—legal, sociological,
and moral.14 Legal legitimacy derives from decisions and state
actions that the public views as comporting with existing law.15
Sociological legitimacy accrues when the public views an
institution or position of the state as “approximately or on the
average oriented to certain determinate ‘maxims’ or rules” that
the society acknowledges as culturally defining.16
Moral
legitimacy differentiates itself from the others by emphasizing
the degree to which the action of the state is intuitively
justifiable under prevailing moral standards and is thus a
respectable use of power.17
Despite the reliance of each
dimension on different, although somewhat overlapping
justification, each of these types of legitimacy share the
characteristic that they represent a collective process of
determination and conclusion based on the extrapolation of
cultural norms relative to relevant social goals being pursued.
It is important to note that the threshold a policy or
institution must reach in terms of its legal, sociological or moral
legitimacy is not fixed.18 Similarly, the strands of legitimacy are

110th Cong. 13 (2008) [hereinafter Improving Detainee Policy] (statement of Benjamin
Wittes), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2008_hr/detainee.pdf.
14 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787,
1790 (2005).
15 Id. at 1794–95.
16 MAX WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 124 (Talcott
Parsons, ed., A.M. Henderson & Talcott Parsons trans., 1957); Fallon, supra note 14, at
1795–96.
17 Fallon, supra note 14, at 1796–1801 (describing moral legitimacy).
18 See generally id. at 1796–99 (discussing moral legitimacy and ideal and minimal
theories as thresholds for such).
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intertwined.19 Because legitimation is a collective process, state
actions are judged relative to the collective’s baseline
understanding of whether the policy goal and policy actor are
worthy of societal trust in producing normatively good results
consistent with cultural values.20 In the context of armed conflict
and national security, this background understanding adjusts to
society’s perception of the urgency of governmental action and
whether the institution executing state action is acting sincerely
in response to the public interest rather than engaging in selfdealing.
2. Legitimation Failings in the War on Terror
The dissipation of the legitimacy of the war on terror policy
Wittes cites from 2002 to the present is unquestionably due to a
variety of missteps relating to the substantive provisions of U.S.
policy.21 In this vein, he argues that the Bush Administration
“obtusely refused to tailor the detention system contemplated by
the laws of war to the very unusual features of the current
conflict.”22
There is no doubt that the public’s view of a policy as being
normatively “correct” in substance plays a great role in
ascertaining the legitimacy Fallon describes.23 Because the
trustworthiness of the actor (the President) is instrumental in
society’s acceptance of state action, disclosure, debate and the
aura of the incorporation or airing of dissenting views heightens
the acceptability of acts otherwise contrary to other collective
values. Similarly, tailoring substantive policy as closely as
possible to existing law demonstrates (real or imagined)
adherence to previously made policy judgments that retain value
to society.
President Lincoln often implicitly recognized these
limitations through his speeches and actions during the Civil
War. He justified deviations from existing norms by invoking a
“necessity” defense that was underscored by the pervasive effects
of the war on nearly every American and the procedural
difficulties of Congressional action inherent to the time.24
Instead of simply asserting plenary executive power over the use
of force and the suspension of individual rights, he conceded that
See generally id. at 1789–94.
See generally id. at 1811, 1818, 1848–51.
Improving Detainee Policy, supra note 13, at 13.
Id.
Fallon, supra note 14, at 1795.
JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE
BUSH ADMINISTRATION 191–92 (2007).
19
20
21
22
23
24
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his actions required Congressional ratification.25 These acts of
ratification provided external validation which made societal
acceptance more palatable.26
In contrast, Congressional
validation of war on terror policies was seen as an unacceptable
divestiture of the Administration’s theory of executive power and,
as such, a last resort only to be taken following repudiation by
the judicial branch.27
B. International Affairs, International Law, and the Effect on
Legitimacy
The
legitimating
value
Lincoln
gained
through
Congressional ratification may ultimately tell a lesson that is
more about the value of external validation than domestic checks
and balances. For Lincoln, congressional ratification of imposing
a military blockade and suspending habeas corpus was essential
because the Constitutional text clearly invoked Congressional
powers in those actions, even if such powers were not explicitly
granted to the legislature.28
In the war on terror, international law, and especially
international humanitarian law, has played a crucial role in
providing the previously established standards in the most
fevered debates over detention policy and accepted means of
interrogation.29 The primacy of international law in these realms
is somewhat surprising given the American predisposition to
dismiss the importance of international law generally. In spite of
this general attitude to such law, I believe that international law
has acted as a cornerstone here in gauging the legitimacy of state
action as a general matter.
This is due to the greater
incorporation into a rights-oriented regime affecting traditionally
domestic concerns combined with (1) its place as an external
benchmark of executive action; and (2) the absence of
domestically embedded rules and standards acting contrary to
the thrust of international law.
1. The Transformation of International Law
Notions of appropriate presidential fashion are not the only
things to have changed since Lincoln’s tenure. The substantive
scope and nature of international law has changed dramatically
NEELY, supra note 3, at 8.
Id. at 29–30.
See generally GOLDSMITH, supra note 24, at 205–13.
Of course, the predominant view of the time was that the suspension of habeas
corpus was exclusively granted to Congress as discussed in Ex parte Merryman, 17 F.Cas.
144, 148–52 (C.C.Md. 1861) (No. 9,487).
29 See GOLDSMITH, supra note 24, at 39–42, 60–64, 113–14.
25
26
27
28
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since Lincoln’s management of the Civil War. While notions of
the customs and practices of war figured prominently (albeit
often pejoratively) in the Lincoln White House, these notions
were locked in great ambiguity and considered the vestiges of
non-analogous imports of international European conflicts of
relatively recent vintage.30
Debates continue to roil among academics and policy-makers
over the proper Constitutional station of treaty and customary
international law and the forces of compliance international law
exerts over state action.31 Those very worthy debates are beyond
the scope of this Essay. However those debates might be
resolved, the materially different perception of the legitimacy of
the war-oriented actions of Presidents Bush and Lincoln, in part,
seems to reflect the power of international law framework to
organize and set the terms of the debate prior to the initiation of
armed conflict—a framework that sets the tone by which
legitimacy can be ascertained or denied.
This economic integration has caused greater political
integration that in turn has spurred greater legal integration in
international law.32 Simultaneously, the substantive scope of
international law has dramatically expanded to one emphasizing
individual rights and away from traditional conceptions of
sovereignty.33 This movement has sparked a proliferation of
international legal restrictions that emanate from outside the
federal government generally, and outside the Executive Branch,
specifically.34
The legal landscape of extra-executive forces regulating
executive action has changed dramatically since Lincoln’s
presidency.35 Following World War II, the United States faced
growing mistrust of government power in the wake of Vietnam
and Watergate.36 These led to a number of congressional actions
more strictly regulating executive action in armed conflict and
foreign affairs, including more stringent regulation of intelligence

See NEELY, supra note 3, at 139–44, 150, 234–35.
Christopher Linde, The U.S. Constitution and International Law: Finding the
Balance, 15 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 305, 307 (2006).
32 Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Legal Integration of NAFTA Through Supranational
Adjudication, 43 TEX. INT’L L.J. 349 (2008).
33 Id. at 351–52.
34 Id. at 357.
35 Michael P. Allen, George W. Bush and the Nature of Executive Authority: The Role
of Courts in a Time of Constitutional Change, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 871, 873–76 (2007).
36 Richard Morin & Dan Balz, Americans Losing Trust in Each Other and
Institutions, WASH. POST, Jan. 28, 1996, at A1.
30
31
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gathering,37 the President’s use of force,38 federal criminal
liability for actions of soldiers in the field,39 as well as more
generous rules on access to federal courts under habeas corpus
and civil suit actions.40 These restrictions were heightened by
the proliferating growth in international law in regulating state
behavior through the exercise of universal jurisdiction and
international criminal prosecutions,41 which left American
officials exposed to ambiguous legal norms and systems of
criminal justice “not beholden to any government and a
prosecutorial system without real political checks and
balances.”42 As a matter of domestic law, “lawfare” was made
more tangible by congressional actions restricting the President’s
power over military affairs, increasing access to federal courts
under habeas corpus and civil suit actions, and the expanding
scope of international law regulating behavior on the
battlefield.43
The enforcement of the law of war during Lincoln’s
presidency was based on reciprocity.44 As such, the nature of one
state’s obligation under the law could expand or contract based
on the degree of compliance honored by its enemy.45 Moreover,
the substantive limitations imposed on a state by the customary
international law of the time were abstract in substance,
quintessentially international in nature, and infrequently
enforced by penalty.46 Perhaps most importantly, the law of war,
reflecting international law of the time more generally,
unquestionably emphasized state restraint rather than
individual right.

37 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783
(1978) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1863 (2006)).
38 War Powers Act of 1973, 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2006).
39 War Crimes Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2000); see also GOLDSMITH, supra note
24, at 64 (discussing OLC memoranda assessing the reach of Miranda rule applicability in
Afghanistan).
40 Compare Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S.
466, 484 (2004); and actions under the Bivens doctrine, Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1972).
41 Milena Sterio, The Evolution of International Law, 31 B. C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV.
213, 213–14 (2008).
42 GOLDSMITH, supra note 24, at 62.
43 See William G. Hyland Jr., Law v. National Security: When Lawyers Make
Terrorism Policy, 7 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS., 247, 249–50 (2008).
44 Diane Marie Amann, Punish or Surveil, 16 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
873, 878–79 (2007).
45 See Sean Watts, Reciprocity and the Law of War, 50 HARV. INT’L L.J. 365, 368–71
(2009) (for a discussion of the general principles of reciprocity).
46 See generally Robert Fabrikant, Lincoln, Emancipation, and “Military Necessity”:
Review of Burrus M. Carnahan’s Act of Justice, Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation and
the Law of War, 52 HOW. L.J. 375, 388–90 (2009) (for a discussion of the international law
of war at the start of the Civil War) (book review).
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Contemporary international law triumphs rights over
encouraging restraint.47
While customary international
humanitarian law in Lincoln’s era provided protection to
noncombatants such as women,48 children49 and the elderly,50
these protections were not intrinsic to the person, but reflective
of institutional values of the aristocracy and organized religions
of the day.51 International humanitarian law of the time was
also considered irrelevant in matters considered domestic in
nature and thus subject to the internal sovereign order of the
state.52 This externally oriented view of international law norms
has likewise given way to an atmosphere in international law
that all that is domestic is also international.53 A shift toward
regulating internal as well as international activity has
permeated the regulation of international humanitarian law as
well.54
The development of a rights-oriented focus of international
humanitarian law is due, in large part, to the continuing
proliferation of rights-based treaties and doctrines including the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) as
well as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.55 The
drafting, interpretation and scholarship that have surrounded
the growing structure of human rights law has encouraged a
growing “parallelism between norms, and a growing measure of
convergence in their personal and territorial applicability.”56
Common Article 3 of the Conventions affords rights to
individuals in non-international armed conflict.57 Similarly,
Article 2(7) of the U.N. Charter acts to ensure that matters
within states’ domestic jurisdiction shall not prejudice the
application of enforcement measures within the U.N. structure.58
47 Phil C.W. Chan, The Legal Status of Taiwan and the Legality of the Use of Force
in a Cross-Taiwan Strait Conflict, 8 CHINESE L.J. 455, 488 (2009) (noting that “the
protection of human rights is a chief imperative of contemporary international law”).
48 Theodor Meron, The Humanization of Humanitarian Law, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 239,
242 (2000).
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 See generally Theodor Meron, Francis Lieber’s Code and Principles of Humanity,
36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 269 (1997) (for a discussion of humanitarian law during the
Civil War).
52 Meron, supra note 48, at 247.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 247–48.
55 Brian Barbour & Brian Gorlick, Embracing the ‘Responsibility to Protect’: A
Repertoire of Measures Including Asylum For Potential Victims, 20 INT’L J. REFUGEE L.
533, 537 (2008).
56 Meron, supra note 48, at 245.
57 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
58 Meron, supra note 48, at 247; U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
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The expanding scope and transformation of the underlying
premise of international law from organizing state action to
protecting human rights has altered the way in which states
react to international law as a guidepost in determining state
policy and behavior.59 As related to the war on terror, the
Geneva Conventions have taken center stage in the tension
between international law and U.S. policy.60
2. Geneva as a Touchstone
It is a paradox in many ways that President Lincoln is
considered a crucial figure in the structural development and
substantive content of the contemporary law of international
armed conflict. The Leiber Code, promulgated by Lincoln in
1863, provided both one of the earliest governmental
codifications delineating acceptable and unacceptable behavior
and tactics by government troops, and also endorsed the broadbased suffering of civilian populations as a byproduct of a total
war doctrine justified under military necessity.61
It has become a fundamental rallying cry by opponents to
U.S. policy in the domestic and international political arenas that
the U.S. must “follow the Geneva Conventions.”62 The belief that
the Bush Administration has sought to circumvent the
Conventions has led to a pervasive conclusion that the United
States’ “take on the Geneva Conventions destroys America’s
international reputation for the rule of law.”63
The substantive significance of Geneva compliance is largely
lost on the vast majority of non-academic commentators making
this plea.
The reality is that the general population,
understandably, does not know what the Conventions require in
any detail. Nor does it seem likely to me that a comprehensive
understanding of each of the Conventions, their applicability,
and the rights afforded to various classes of detainees would
matter to the underlying debate.
A comprehensive
understanding of the substantive provisions of the Conventions
ultimately does not matter. I suspect the cry for Geneva
Conventions compliance represents two broader understandings
that are viewed as crucial to the American public: (1) the
See generally Chan, supra note 47, at 488.
Jonathan F. Mitchell, Legislating Clear-Statement Regimes in National-Security
Law, 43 GA. L. REV. 1059, 1076–77, 1093–99.
61 Charles A. Flint, Challenging the Legality of Section 106 of the USA PATRIOT
Act, 67 ALB. L. REV. 1183, 1190 (2004).
62 Faiz Shakir, Fox Guest: We Should Ignore McCain Since He ‘Was So Traumatized’
By P.O.W. Experience, THINK PROGRESS, Sept. 19, 2006, http://thinkprogress.org/
2006/09/19.damato/.
63 Thomas P.M. Barnett, The State of the World, ESQUIRE, May 1, 2007, at 108.
59
60
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Conventions represent the presence of defined extra-executive
checks on executive action; and (2) failing to comply with the
Conventions is viewed as the repudiation of a previously made
commitment to other nations.
Beyond the domestic base, however, is the fact that much of
the domestic legal debate has unfolded within the framework of
international law, that U.S. policies at home and abroad violated
such law, and that U.S. population and the international
population found such violations as highly objectionable.
The belief that the U.S. was acting in violation of
international law not only affected the perception of U.S. policy,
but also materially affected the ability of the nation to sew
together a sturdy and cohesive web of allies who could be relied
upon to provide assistance in a variety of different ways.
The influence of international law as a legitimating device
(or, in this case a de-legitimating device) is evident through
President Bush’s handling of the question of the applicability of
Geneva Convention protections for individuals detained pursuant
to the war on terror.64 Likely more than any other single body of
law, the Bush Administration’s decision to forego adherence to
the Geneva Conventions in favor of a more generalized promise
to respect the “spirit” of Geneva law has drawn criticism by both
the American and global population.
The decision to forego a structural commitment to the
Conventions in favor of a spiritual one implied that the details of
the protections encompassed therein were not only unimportant,
but also needed to be discarded in order to pursue the effective
prosecution of the war on terror.
II. SOME POSSIBLE LESSONS ON A ROLE FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW
During the Civil War, President Lincoln’s policies were
patently clothed in the threat of the dissolution of the nation.65
The Constitutional doctrine that flowed from this obvious threat
was based, and accepted, on a premise of necessity that was
understood by the populace, even when the resulting policies
were unpopular.66 The war on terror does not share these
characteristics. The threat to America is not only foreign to our

64 See Sharon Kehnemui Liss, Bush:Gitmo Prisoners Protected by Geneva
Conventions, FOX NEWS, Jun. 9, 2005, http://www.foxnews.com/story/
0,2933,44169,00.html.
65 Michel Rosenfeld, Executive Autonomy, Judicial Authority and the Rule of Law:
Reflections on Constitutional Interpretation and the Separation of Powers, 15 CARDOZO L.
REV. 137, 169 (1993).
66 Williams, supra note 11, at 681.
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common understandings but is also less intense in its severity.
The latency of the threat is further complicated by the fact that
the policies that have been created to address the terrorist threat
are unfolding in a political culture that remains scarred by the
increasingly routine nature of government abuses of power and
position that have come to light over the past fifty years, not only
as a general matter, but within the realm of national security
concerns in particular. These realities have placed a premium on
building consensus, both internationally and domestically, and
forcing the political investment of as many institutions and
groups as possible.
The contemporary framework of international law and
international organizations has served as an obstacle to the
legitimation of current U.S. policy, but also created an
unmatched structural opportunity for President Obama to
incorporate U.S. policy preferences into the goals, operations, and
structures of the international system. This can perhaps best be
done by incorporating structural restraints on the exercise of
U.S. power as the general rule while simultaneously opening the
debate over the normative desirability of provisions of
international law that he perceives as obstructing U.S. goals.
Similarly, purveyors of international law are best served not
by reflexive service to provisions of existing law, but through the
advocacy of the type of structural limitations that international
law has proven most effective—procedural safeguards and
overarching principles of action.
The process of public debate in the United States encourages
an airing of policy choices that may tweak the executive’s
proposed policy or encourage more fundamental restructuring of
policy frameworks. As an international matter, the incorporation
of allies, enemies and NGOs forces recognition of an underlying
value to a controversial policy in an attempt to stake out
substantive grounds for the purpose of compromise.67 In both
circumstances, the policy of the President no longer emanates
from the executive branch alone, but creates investment among a
group of actors that, as a consequence of that investment, creates
legitimacy.

67 This policy movement among allies and NGOs is evident in recent discussions as
to the approach of the Obama Administration’s approach to future of the detainees at
Guantanamo Bay. See Scott Shane, Mark Mazzetti & Helene Cooper, Obama Reverses
Key Bush Policy, but Questions on Detainees Remain, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2009, at A16.
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A. Consensus Building and International Dialogue
The conflict between exercising unilateral power and
engaging in a consultative process is, at heart, playing out the
tension between exercising the discretion that attaches to
unilateral power against the intrinsic constraints that
accompany seeking approval from other parties. In resolving this
tension, the executive branch sacrifices discretion to some degree
each time it pursues external approval. Similarly, presidential
policies are vulnerable to the external challenge of illegitimacy
when the foundation of those policies is exclusively the unilateral
power of the President.68 This give-and-take represents a core
element of many commentators’ critiques of the Bush
Administration’s failure to engage in consultation and consensus
building.69 Instead of integrating legal constraints into a broader
framework of war policy, the Administration “chose to push its
legal discretion to its limit, and rejected any binding legal
constraints.”70
Working within international law affecting security policy
encourages the executive branch to engage in its policy decisionmaking and execution in as transparent a manner as possible
and justifies such actions in public in order to preserve
underlying policy goals that might otherwise be compromised.
Moreover, the incorporation of international law does not
preclude legislative override where necessary. The last-in-time
doctrine enables the political branches to supersede international
law through the passage of contradictory federal legislation.71
The formal incorporation of Congress through such a process
fosters public debate both domestically and internationally, and
also provides incentive for the legislature to come off the sideline
to place preferred policies on solid legal footing. Regardless of its
success or failure, the process of forming legislation and engaging
in the political machinations that surround prospective
legislation encourages a broader public dialogue as well as a focal

68 As a doctrinal matter this concept is a rough corollary of judicial assessment of
the constitutional validity of executive action in Youngstown. See Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 582 (1952) (holding a violation of Presidential authority
based on an external constitutional challenge).
69 See, e.g., Lawmakers react to Miers’ withdrawal, CNN, Oct. 27, 2005,
http://www.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/10/27/miers.reax/index.html
(quoting
Senator
Charles Schumer from New York suggesting Bush should take his time “carefully with
real consultation and real consensus. One of the reasons for this problem–this mistake–is
that there was no real consultation.”).
70 GOLDSMITH, supra note 24, at 119.
71 Justin C. Danilewitz, The Ties That Bind: U.S. Foreign Policy Commitments and
the Constitutionality of Entrenching Executive Agreements, 14 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y
87, 91 (2004).
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point for discussion of policy issues upon which debate can
unfold. The focal points of such debates tend to revolve around
legislation that sparks the greatest public concern and reflects
positions centered on popular understanding of the “most
important” points surrounding the issue.
Invitation for public debate in the policy-making process
enables dissenting views to voice opinions and air grievances.
More broadly, incorporating the public into the debate acts as a
functional and productive way to curb the vitriol of dissent—
which perceives itself as unduly marginalized and unjustly
silenced in affecting the actions and direction of government.
Public inclusion in the broader policy judgments of war and
armed conflict not only enables public opinion an outlet and
opportunity for enhanced focus but also encourages public
investment in the policy outcome that is ultimately embraced at
the conclusion of the process, even if that outcome reflects a
decision against the passage of any legislation.
B. Extra-Executive Structural Regulations
International law provides a substantive framework for
many of the types of legal difficulties that occur frequently
among nations but are typically under-examined in the domestic
legal context. In such circumstances, international law can
provide the structural design to move the executive toward
consensus building through constraints that guard against the
intrinsic temptation of the executive branch to maximize its own
power at the potential cost of losing its credibility. Where norm
vacuums exist in sorting out the law as a domestic matter,
international law often provides a basic substantive framework
around which more extensive law can be built domestically.
These structural and touchstone characteristics of
international law assist the public in assessing, and accepting,
final provisions of law carried out in policy.
Specifically,
incorporating international law in the domestic process (1)
promotes international and domestic political dialogue; (2)
encourages the executive branch to engage in formal and
informal justification of its policies; and (3) incentivizes
transparency through public disclosure.
The importance of structural limitations surrounding
executive action is demonstrable in the discussion surrounding
the treatment of prisoners at Guantanamo Bay. Addressing the
issue of the standard of treatment of U.S. detainees, President
Bush asserted that the U.S. would treat detainees “humanely
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and, to the extent appropriate and consistent with military
necessity . . . .”72 The power of this statement as a force of
legitimation, is compromised by the fact that “it was very vague,
it was not effectively operationalized into concrete standards of
conduct, and it left all of the hard issues about ‘humane’ and
‘appropriate’ treatment to the discretion of unknown officials.”73
Even setting aside the question of ambiguity in determining
core terms such as “humane” and “appropriate,” the President’s
statement fails on an even more fundamental level. The failure
to effectively operationalize questions of treatment implies that
the President’s commitment is being less than fully absorbed by
lower officials, but the failure reaches beyond that. It is the
failure of any extra-executive check on the formulation of the
policy, and a total lack of observable way to ensure that the
overarching policy statement is being implemented, that dooms
the President’s assertion to face endless scrutiny and skepticism.
CONCLUSION
My characterization of international law as a device that
facilitates sociological legitimacy of policy decisions relative to
the war on terror is simply to note that the key position
international law compliance has taken in the ongoing debate
over national security law issues. American history is rife with
examples of the importance of international affairs in major
domestic policy determinations. What makes the ongoing war on
terror so interesting is the expansive manner in which
international law has guided the manner in which these
important domestic decisions are discussed, digested, and
weighed as a domestic matter—and how that process has
transpired with little handwringing over the validity or relevance
of international law writ large.

72 George W. Bush, Memorandum on Humane Treatment of Taliban and al Qaeda
Detainees, (Feb. 7, 2002), http://www.pegc.us/archive/White_House/
bush_memo_20020207_ed.pdf
73 GOLDSMITH, supra note 24, at 120.

